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Abstract 
 
Ratifying conventions adopted by the International Labor Organization creates legal obligations 
to improve labor standards in the domestic economy. Why and when do states choose to ratify 
them? Two influential theoretical approaches lead to the expectation that states are influenced 
by the ratification behavior of other states. Drawing on rationalist institutionalism, we expect 
states to use institutions such as the ILO to improve or consolidate their preferred standards 
domestically while reducing the risk of suffering competitive disadvantages in world markets. In 
this view, ILO conventions are devices for the prevention and mitigation of regulatory "races to 
the bottom" among trade rivals. Drawing on sociological institutionalism, we expect states to 
ratify ILO conventions if doing so conforms to a norm of appropriate behavior that is prevalent 
in a state's peer groups. We elaborate on the latter explanation by identifying the domestic 
conditions of interdependent ratification. The paper develops observable implications of these 
hypotheses and tests them by applying spatial regression models to seven core ILO conventions 
and 187 countries between 1948 and 2009. The analysis yields strong evidence in support of 
both rationalist and the sociological hypotheses. The paper contributes to the literature on treaty 
ratification and policy diffusion.  
 
 
 2 
Introduction 
Since its creation in 1919, the International Labor Organization (ILO) has adopted 189 
conventions on topics such as freedom of association, collective bargaining, forced labor, child 
labor, gender and other forms of discrimination, social security, working time, and occupational 
health and safety. ILO conventions are international treaties that are legally binding for states 
that choose to ratify them. But they occupy a peculiar position among international treaties. In 
other policy domains such as trade and arms control, treaties are often signed in the expectation 
of reciprocal behavior: for instance, a state may grant access to its domestic market in exchange 
for access to foreign markets for its own producers; or it may commit to refrain from developing 
certain kinds of weaponry in order to secure a similar commitment by other states. But 
reciprocity cannot be considered a key driver in all policy domains. Most notably, human rights 
treaties are unlikely to be ratified, and complied with, on the basis of direct reciprocity. As Beth 
Simmons notes, “[n]o government is likely to alter its own rights practices to reciprocate for 
abuses elsewhere.”1 The conventions adopted by the ILO should be particularly interesting for 
IR scholars because they mix features of both kinds of treaties: those that are negotiated 
primarily on the basis of reciprocity and those that are not. On the one hand, at least some of the 
ILO conventions are designed to mitigate regulatory competition in labor and social standards. 
The ILO itself points at this motivation in its promotional material:  
 
“An international legal framework on social standards ensures a level playing field in the 
global economy. It helps governments and employers to avoid the temptation of 
lowering labour standards in the belief that this could give them a greater comparative 
                                                 
1
 Simmons 2009, 129. 
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advantage in international trade … Because international labour standards are minimum 
standards adopted by governments and the social partners, it is in everyone’s interest to 
see these rules applied across the board, so that those who do not put them into practice 
do not undermine the efforts of those who do.”2  
 
The logic described in this excerpt implies reciprocity: states are expected to commit to 
international labor standards primarily to get other states to commit to, and comply with, those 
same standards.  
 
On the other hand, the ILO and many other actors portray commitment to core labor 
standards as having intrinsic normative value: the same ILO document quoted above stresses 
that adherence to international labor standards is imperative because work “is crucial to a 
person’s dignity, well-being and development as a human being”.3 Several conventions, such as 
those on freedom of association, child labor, forced labor, discrimination, migrants, and 
domestic workers are explicitly presented as protecting “fundamental human rights”.4 In this 
logic, states are expected to ratify conventions as way to endorsing and expressing a public and 
legally binding commitment to a universally valid conception of human dignity.  
 
So, why do states ratify ILO conventions? More precisely, why and when do some states 
choose to ratify certain core conventions? To the extent that they want to avoid regulatory 
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competition, their decision to ratify should be influenced by the ratification behavior of their 
economic competitors. To the extent that they want to show support for a norm they believe in, 
we should expect ratification by those states whose values and practices in labor and social 
policy are consistent with ILO norms. The latter expectation is consistent with the theory of 
“rationally expressive ratification” proposed by Simmons in relation to human rights treaties.5 
But the values that state agents choose to affirm by making international commitments are not 
entirely endogenous: they are likely to be influenced by the norms expressed by other states, 
particularly by states that they consider to be “peers”.  
 
This suggests that we should expect ratification decisions to be interdependent not only 
insofar as they reflect competitive considerations, but also insofar as they reflect a desire to 
belong to a normative community of states. But who is influenced by whom is likely to be 
different in the two cases. The aim of this paper is to develop hypotheses about interdependent 
ratification and provide empirical tests. The hypotheses are derived from rationalist 
institutionalism as well as sociological institutionalism, and thus draw on both rationalist and 
constructivist research traditions in International Relations. The relationship between rationalist 
and constructivist theories has attracted considerable attention over the past two decades.6 Our 
analytical starting point is that the social mechanisms theorized within the two traditions can 
coexist and operate in parallel, and thus we have no reason to expect that any evidence pointing 
at the importance of one class of mechanisms ipso facto proves that the other plays a negligible 
                                                 
5
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role. In other words, we want to avoid what Jeffrey Checkel has called a “gladiator” style of 
analysis, where “one perspective goes forth and slays all others”.7  
 
The next section develops hypotheses on interdependent ratification derived from rationalist 
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. Drawing on the former, we argue that states 
should use international labor standards to solve cooperation problems under conditions of 
strategic interdependence. If states desire to improve domestic labor standards but are concerned 
that this may advantage their economic competitors in world markets, a joint commitment to 
international labor standards monitored by the ILO may provide sufficient reassurance that their 
relative competitiveness will not be substantially affected. If this is correct, we should expect 
states to be more willing to commit to ILO standards when their trade rivals have already done 
so. We then develop a hypothesis based on sociological institutionalism: states will make formal 
commitments to international labor standards when doing so conforms to a norm of appropriate 
behavior that is prevalent in a state's peer groups. More specifically, states should be more 
willing to ratify conventions in the wake of ratification by states to which they are intensely 
linked through international organizations. The third section presents our methodological 
strategy, which based on spatial regression models applied to seven core ILO conventions and 
187 countries between 1948 and 2009. The fourth section presents the outcome of this analysis: 
we find that there is strong empirical support for both the rationalist and the sociological 
hypotheses. 
 
                                                 
7
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Our focus on international interdependencies is compatible with the fact that the ratification 
of ILO conventions is ultimately a process driven by domestic actors interacting within a 
domestic institutional setting. The fifth section of this paper aims to gain a deeper insight into 
the causal mechanisms of interdependent ratification, by considering how foreign influences 
interact with domestic politics in the ratification process. A case study of the ratification of the 
ILO’s equal pay convention by the United Kingdom provides qualitative evidence for our 
constructivist hypothesis and at the same time suggests the following conjecture: ratification of 
ILO conventions by social peers can “tip the balance” in the domestic contest between 
supporters and opponents of ratification, by providing argumentative ammunition to former. A 
quantitative test of the ratification of two ILO anti-discrimination conventions provides further 
evidence in support of that conjecture: ratification by social peers has a statistically significant 
effect on ratification where the pro-ratification coalition (using the percentage of legislators who 
are female as proxy) is neither very strong nor very weak. These are the conditions under which 
foreign examples have the greatest potential to tip the balance in favor of ratification. The final 
section draws some conclusions. 
 
Theories of interdependent ratification 
  
Two influential perspectives in IR theory, rationalist institutionalism and sociological 
institutionalism, provide reasons to expect the decision to ratify ILO conventions to be 
influenced by the ratification behavior of other states. While both approaches would predict the 
interdependence of ratification decisions, they stress different sets of causal mechanisms and 
thus would expect different patterns of interdependence to emerge.  
 7 
 
Rationalist institutionalism in IR theory conceives states as unitary actors that pursue their 
own interests as if they were rational utility-maximizers, in an environment characterized by the 
absence of an external enforcer of agreements and by variable levels of uncertainty about the 
interests and behavior of other states.8 Rationalist institutionalism focuses on situations of 
strategic interdependence, in which the benefits accruing to each state are determined not only 
by its behavior but also by the behavior of other states. In such situations, often states have 
mixed motives: they have a common interest in cooperating, but also incentives to cheat and/or 
shift the distribution of gains from cooperation to their advantage. As a result, the outcomes of 
state interaction are often inefficient, as potential gains are “left on the table”. The key thesis of 
rationalist institutionalists is that states are able to mitigate the problem of inefficiency by 
manipulating the context of their interaction and specifically by creating and sustaining 
international institutions and organizations. International institutions and organizations can 
alleviate distributional and enforcement problems by providing information about state 
preferences, constraining bargaining strategies, providing focal points in negotiations, 
facilitating issue linkages, reducing ambiguity about what constitutes compliance and non-
compliance, monitoring compliance, and coordinating decentralized sanctioning. 
 
                                                 
8
 The literature on the theoretical building blocks and empirical applications of rational institutionalism is vast. The 
first full book-length exposition was Keohane 1984, and concise statements of the key assumptions and 
expectations of this approach are provided by Keohane and Martin 2003 and Stein 2008. 
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There is ample evidence that the ILO was created in order to address problems of strategic 
interdependence in labor standards policy.9 This rationale is clearly stated in the preamble to the 
Constitution of the ILO, approved in 1919 as Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles: “the failure of 
any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which 
desire to improve the conditions in their own countries”. Policy-makers hoped that, by agreeing 
on and implementing common standards, they would be able to improve labor conditions 
according to domestic preferences without compromising the ability of their industries to 
compete with foreign producers. There is some debate on whether strategic interdependence 
with regard to labor standards has the form of a “prisoner’s dilemma” (PD) game or an 
assurance game. Thomas Palley, for instance, models it as a PD.10 Alan Hyde, by contrast, 
argues that at least some types of labor standards give rise to a stag hunt, or assurance game.11 
The key difference is that in an assurance scenario mutual cooperation is a stable equilibrium 
because each state prefers to keep high labor standards in its jurisdiction provided that other 
states do the same, whereas in a PD scenario mutual collaboration is more fragile because states 
are tempted to defect from cooperation and use low standards to gain a competitive advantage. 
What is common to both PD and assurance situations is the worst outcome that states want to 
avoid, i.e. they are left to implement high standards while their competitors lower theirs or fail 
to raise them. This may be because the welfare losses caused by the loss of market shares are 
perceived to be higher than the welfare gains resulting from improved labor standards. When 
states are uncertain about whether their counterparts prefer mutual cooperation to unilateral 
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defection or vice versa, in order to avoid the worst-case outcome they may decide not to 
cooperate even if they themselves prefer mutual cooperation to unilateral defection.    
 
Rationalist institutionalism expects states to design institutions that have a good “fit” with 
specific types of cooperation problems. Specifically, institutions meant to address assurance 
problems are likely to be different from institutions aimed at solving PDs.12 The key task of the 
latter is to reduce the temptation to cheat, notably by monitoring compliance and helping states 
to use strategies of decentralized sanctioning that would sustain cooperation in a repeated game. 
By contrast, institutions addressing assurance problems must make it easier for states to assure 
each other that they indeed prefer mutual cooperation to cheating. When states are highly 
uncertain about the preferences of other states, monitoring institutions may need to be as robust 
and intrusive as they would be in a PD. This means that, under conditions of high uncertainty, 
the institutional implications of the two situations may be quite similar. 
 
The ILO has several of the features that rationalist institutionalists would expect to find in an 
organization aimed at addressing PD and assurance problems. The often detailed content of ILO 
conventions reduces ambiguity about what constitutes compliance and makes it easier to 
determine whether a state has complied or not. States are subject to demanding reporting 
obligations, and the supervisory system of the ILO processes information on national labor laws 
and practices that originates not only from governments but also from private organizations, 
notably labor unions. States that are found to be in violation of their obligations are “named and 
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shamed”.13 While the ILO itself does not apply sanctions, its findings about, and criticism of, 
serious violators of ILO norms can be used by other states to legitimize sanctions that they may 
decide to impose.14  
 
As noted above, both in the assurance and in the PD scenario the worst outcome for each 
state is to implement high labor standards while its competitors lower theirs or fail to raise them. 
The implication of this is that the decision to ratify ILO conventions should be affected by 
whether other states, and specifically direct trade competitors, have ratified or not. Ratification 
by trade rivals does not guarantee effective implementation of ILO standards on their part, but it 
creates domestic and international costs that may be sufficient to reassure states that other states 
are willing to comply.15 The hypothesis derived from rationalist institutionalism is thus the 
following:  
Hypothesis 1: A state is more likely to ratify an ILO convention when its economic 
competitors have ratified it. 
 
Our hypothesis is similar to the idea “strategic complementarity” tested by Nancy Chau and 
Ravi Kanbur, by which “the adoption of high labor standards in one country raises the net 
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benefits of raising standards in another country.”16 For the reasons explained in the next section, 
we offer a more fine-grained empirical test of this idea than Chau and Kanbur’s study.  
 
The second major approach that leads us to expect ratification decisions to be interdependent 
is sociological institutionalism. Even more than rationalist institutionalism, sociological 
institutionalism is a complex body of theories, which cannot be reviewed in much depth here. 
These theories depart from rationalism, as they expect states to be guided not only by a “logic of 
consequentialism” but also by a “logic of appropriateness”17 and possibly a “logic of arguing”18; 
and from materialism, since even when states consider expected consequences, often these 
consequences have a social character, such as a sense of belonging, esteem, and shame. For 
sociological institutionalists in IR, the goals, values, normative constraints, and cognitive maps 
of policy-makers are not endogenous to the process of interaction with their foreign 
counterparts, but are at least partly constructed in a social process that transcends state 
boundaries. A particularly influential version of sociological institutionalism has been 
developed by the so-called “Stanford School”, according to which there is a world culture that 
shapes conceptions of appropriate social actors, collective goals, and public policies, and a 
world polity constituted by organizational linkages that transmit this world culture to all states.19 
This world culture defines social expectations in a wide range of policy domains, such as human 
rights, gender relations, science, education, economic policies and environmental protection, 
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and in which state agents seek normative legitimacy by adopting “policy scripts” that are widely 
perceived as being integral to the identity of a “modern” or “good” state. 
 
The ratification of international treaties can be interpreted as one of the ways in which states 
affirm their adherence to norms and thus membership in a normative community.20 The 
conventions adopted by the ILO can certainly be seen as embodying global norms with 
universalistic scope and moral content. The preamble to the ILO constitution justifies its 
creation with reference not only to strategic interdependence in labor policy, as seen above, but 
also to “social justice” and its contribution to world peace. The ILO Declaration of Philadelphia 
of 1944 reaffirmed this goal and stated that “all human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, 
have the right to pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual development in 
conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity.” Core labor 
rights are sometimes presented as integral part of human rights and sometimes as a distinct 
normative complex with its own roots in a conception of human dignity,21 but the ILO and other 
actors routinely frame the conventions as normative models that all legitimate states should 
adopt or at least strive to be in a condition to adopt.  
 
The ratification of ILO conventions can thus be interpreted as an action that affirms a state’s 
membership in a normative community: the community of states committed to promoting a 
conception of social justice. Three points are crucial for the assessment of this interpretation. 
First, the international diffusion of ILO norms can be the result of a range of different social 
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 See Frank 1999; Cole 2005; Wopitka and Ramirez 2008; and Wotipka and Tsutsui 2008. 
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mechanisms. For instance, in a landmark contribution to sociological institutionalism Paul 
DiMaggio and Walter Powell argued that institutional (as opposed to competitive) isomorphism 
could take three forms: coercive, mimetic and normative.22 Building on sociological and 
psychological research, IR scholars have identified a range of micro-mechanisms that can 
produce socialization, i.e. the induction of actors into the norms and rules of a given community. 
Alastair Iain Johnston distinguishes between mimicking, social influence and persuasion;23 
Jeffrey Checkel distinguishes between strategic calculation, role playing, and normative 
suasion;24 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks between coercion, persuasion and acculturation.25 
While compliance with norms as a result of material sanctions and rewards does not normally 
qualify as socialization, social sanctions and rewards – back-patting, esteem, well-being 
resulting from personal consistency, shaming, shunning, etc – can be considered a form of 
socialization even if the norm in question is not fully internalized by the actor. Furthermore, as 
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink have noted, different mechanisms may be predominant 
at different stages of the norm life cycle.26 In recent years there has been significant progress in 
understanding under what scope conditions such mechanisms work or not.27 
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 DiMaggio and Powell 1983. 
23
 Johnston 2001, 2008. 
24
 Checkel 2005,  
25
 Goodman and Jinks 2004. 
26
 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 898. 
27
 See, for instance, Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; and Zürn and Checkel 2005. On domestic scope conditions, 
Cortell and Davis 2005. 
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The second important aspect highlighted by recent research is the variety of channels through 
which norms can “travel” from one country to another, notably the media, transnational 
advocacy networks and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), epistemic 
communities, transgovernmental networks, bilateral diplomacy, and intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs). For a variety of reasons, which have been discussed by Alastair Iain 
Johnstone,28 IGOs understood as social environments have provided a particularly fertile ground 
for research on international socialization.29  
 
Third, the population of IGOs has grown massively over the course of the twentieth century 
and thus opportunities for socialization and norm diffusion have multiplied dramatically. 
However, in contrast to what world polity theorists imply when they state that the world is “a 
unitary social system, increasingly integrated by networks,”30 patterns of membership in IGOs 
and possibly in other environments of state socialization are increasingly fragmented and 
heterogeneous. The issue is not simply that some states have stronger connections to the world 
polity than other states – in fact, inequality in the number of IGO memberships per state has 
decreased. The issue is rather that, as Jason Beckfield points out, “while states are growing more 
even in the number of IGOs they belong to, they increasingly belong to different IGOs.”31 He 
found that, since 1945, the network of IGOs has become more fragmented, more heterogeneous, 
less cohesive, and less “small-worldly” in its structure. This means that the study of norm 
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 Johnston 2008, 26-32. 
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 See, for instance, Finnemore 1996b; Gheciu 2005; Johnston 2008; and Greenhill 2010. 
30
 Boli and Thomas 1997, 172. 
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 Beckfield 2010. 
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diffusion through intergovernmental networks requires a detailed analysis of who is connected 
to whom. 
  
Scholars who apply world polity theory to the analysis of patterns of treaty ratification accept 
that states are likely to differ as to the timing of ratification. For instance, Christine Min 
Wotipka and Francisco Ramirez focus on three factors that should affect the timing of the 
ratification of human rights treaties: the availability of global conferences that promote the 
relevant treaty, the behavior of other states in the world and in their region or other “reference 
groups”, and the degree to which a state is embedded in the wider world that supports the 
relevant norm.32 However, in the light of the uneven and fragmented patterns of IGO 
involvement shown by Beckfield, and the resulting fragmented character of social relations 
through which socialization mechanism can operate, it is important to develop and test more 
fine-grained hypotheses about the interdependence of ratification decisions. If social peer groups 
are defined as states with frequent and intense opportunities for socialization – that is, 
opportunities to persuade each other, express opprobrium or approval, undermine or boost self-
esteem, etc – then the relevant hypothesis can be formulated as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: A state is more likely to ratify an ILO convention when its social peers 
have ratified it. 
 
Chau and Kanbur examined whether the ratification of ILO conventions is affected by 
regional peer effects, by counting how many states in a regional grouping have ratified the 
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relevant conventions.33 Several studies on the ratification of other kinds of treaties also consider 
the proportion of states in a state’s region that have ratified the treaty in question among the 
explanatory variables. However, this is not necessarily the best quantitative indicator of 
socialization effects. As Beth Simmons has stressed, regional effects may be due to purely 
strategic “social camouflage”: if many neighboring states have ratified human rights treaties, 
persistent non-ratifiers are more likely to “stand out” and be targeted by NGOs and other 
advocacy organizations, which often take a regional perspective. If, on the contrary, a 
government is surrounded by other government that have not ratified, then the risk of being 
singled out for criticism is much lower and the incentive to ratify is correspondingly reduced. In 
her study of human rights treaties, Simmons interprets her finding that regional effects are much 
weaker in regions with more persuasion opportunities as evidence that regional clustering is 
caused by strategic calculation rather than localized socialization.34 Rather than taking this 
rather indirect route, this paper aims at capturing the extent of socialization opportunities more 
directly. As we explain below, we measure the degree to which states see each other as 
belonging to the same social peer group by counting the number of IGOs of which any two 
states are joint members. We expect ratification choices of a state to be influenced by the 
ratification behavior of another state in proportion of their opportunities to interact within IGOs. 
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This indicator provides a more fine-grained picture of socialization networks than regional 
belonging, although we expect relevant regional effects to be captured by our measure as well.35 
 
Our focus on joint IGO memberships allows us to examine two additional implications of 
hypothesis 2. The first implication is that, if IGOs function as socializing environments that may 
facilitate the diffusion of labor standards norms among their members, then we should expect 
the effect of joint IGO membership on ratification to be stronger for IGOs that provide better 
opportunities for socialization. We test this implication by comparing the effect of joint 
membership in three categories of IGOs, which differ in the extent to which they provide the 
kind of organizational infrastructure that tends to facilitate socialization processes. 
 
The second implication of hypothesis 2 is that we need to distinguish the extent to which 
ratification is influenced by interaction with specific states from the effect of occupying a central 
position in the general network of states connected through IGOs. To achieve this empirically, 
we assess the effect of the absolute number of IGO memberships of countries on ratification 
behavior. If joint IGO memberships are found to have an effect even after controlling for the 
absolute number of IGO that a country is member of, then this would provide particularly strong 
support for our specific socialization hypothesis. 
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Research Design 
 
We estimate a model including a spatial lag of the variable that captures whether a country 
ratifies an ILO convention, weighted by the number of joint IGO memberships and the intensity 
of economic competition between countries. We also include several variables for country 
characteristics and potential external shocks.36 Consistently with earlier research, we estimate a 
Cox proportional hazards model, with standard errors adjusted for clustering on countries.37 The 
advantage of using the Cox model, among the various survival models on offer, is that it does 
not require us to make assumptions about the shape of the underlying survival distribution. 
Moreover, when a spatial term is included, the use of the Cox model rather than parametric 
survival models is recommended by recent studies.38 The test based on Schoenfeld residuals 
indicates that the proportional-hazards assumption holds.39 We thus estimate the following 
equation: 
                                                 
36
 As recommended by Ward and Gleditsch 2008, we calculate the Moran index, using the total number of ILO 
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hi,t = h0(i,t)exp[β xi,t-1 + δ w ij,t-1 y i,t-5  + εi,t] (1) 
where hit is the hazard rate for country i at time t, h0 is the baseline hazard, β and δ are the 
coefficients, xi,t-1 is a vector of control variables that are lagged by a year, and wi,t-1 yi,t-5  is a 
vector of spatial lag terms.40 Significance tests are based on Huber (robust) standard errors. 
These standard errors control for possible heteroskedasticity (serial correlation) or intra-group 
correlation of the data. 
 
The unit of analysis is country-year. We analyze 187 countries across 62 years, from 1948 to 
2009. However, Convention 29 was ratified before 1948 (in 1930), whereas the others 
conventions were ratified either in 1948 or later. Thus, the time span for this second group of 
conventions starts from the year in which the convention was ratified. For instance, Convention 
100 starts in 1951. Some (mostly very small) countries had to be excluded from the analysis 
because of data limitations. Many countries enter the database in the year of their independence, 
which is often after 1948. Our dataset is therefore unbalanced.   
 
Dependent variables 
For each country in the dataset, we coded whether it ratified an ILO convention in a specific 
year, which allowed us to calculate the time (in terms of years) that a country went without 
ratifying a convention, that is, the hazard rate. We focus on seven conventions that were 
designated “core conventions” by the ILO and whose special importance in the ILO normative 
system has been recognized by the ILO as well as independent observers: these are Convention 
29 (C29), C87, C98, C100, C105, C111, and C138. Two core conventions protect labor union 
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rights. These are C87 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize 
Convention, adopted in 1948 and ratified by 150 states; and C98 Right to Organize and 
Collective Bargaining Convention, adopted in 1949 and ratified by 160 states. Two core 
conventions mandate the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor. These are C29 
Forced Labor Convention, adopted in 1930 and ratified by 174 states; and C105 Abolition of 
Forced Labor Convention, adopted in 1957 and ratified by 169 states. One core convention 
mandates the abolition of child labor: C138 Minimum Age Convention, adopted in 1973 and 
ratified by 156 states (another convention designated as core, C182 Worst Forms of Child Labor 
Convention, was adopted in 1999 and is not included here). Finally, two core conventions 
prohibit discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. These are C100 Equal 
Remuneration Convention, adopted in 1951 and ratified by 168 countries; and C111 
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, adopted in 1958 and ratified by 169 
countries.  
 
Figure 1 shows the survival rate of each convention over the period under investigation. 
Several countries, mainly developed economies, ratified Convention 29 before 1948. These 
observations are therefore left-censored. Specifically, 67 countries are left-censored for C29. We 
analyze each convention independently from the others, and therefore countries drop from the 
dataset when they ratify a convention. Finally, some observations are left censored since a few 
countries ratified these ILO conventions after 2009. For instance, Afghanistan ratified C138 on 
7th April 2010. Ratification information is taken from the ILOLEX Database of International 
Labor Standards.41  
                                                 
41
 Database available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english. 
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FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Independent variables 
Our main independent variables are N*N*t spatial weight matrices. A spatial weight matrix 
measures the impact of a policy change in a country on all other countries. It uses specific 
factors, such as spatial proximity or degree of economic interdependence, to weigh the 
importance of a policy change in one unit for other units. In our case, the policy change is 
whether a state has ratified an ILO convention during the previous five years. The variable is 
lagged by one year to avoid simultaneity bias.42 For instance, Afghanistan ratified C105 in 1963 
and thus our lagged dependent variable scores 1 from 1964 to 1968.  It should be noted that this 
may lead to underestimating the spatial effect, if a state’s announcement of its intention to ratify 
is sufficient to trigger a reaction in other states. The reason for the five-year cut-off point is that, 
after some time, the external effects of ratification should disappear, with other countries either 
having ratified the same ILO convention or having decided not to “react”.43 
 
We weigh the influence of policy change on other states in a way that approximates as 
closely as possible the theoretical logics of rational institutionalism and sociological 
institutionalism. Hypothesis 1 generates the expectation that the degree to which state A will 
                                                 
42
 See Beck et al. 2006. 
43
 The five-year cut-off point is consistent with the operationalization used by Egger and Larch 2008 in a spatial 
econometric analysis on the proliferation of trade agreements. In the Web-Appendix, we check the robustness of 
our results by changing this value to three years. 
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respond to B’s ratification by ratifying the same convention itself depends on the degree of 
economic competition between A and B. To measure the degree of competition we use an index 
developed by Elkins, Guzman and Simmons.44 This indicator is obtained by disaggregating 
trade flows into 17 sectors and then assessing whether countries export the same basket of 
goods. Data are from the World Development Indicators. To create an index of export 
similarity, we correlated the export basket of all countries.45 We label this variable EXPORT 
SIMILARITY. 46  
 
Formally, the spatial weight of the variable COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION for state A is:47 
 
[ ]∑ ∗=
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'
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 Elkins et al. 2006, 830. 
45
 For computational reasons, and following Elkins et al. 2006, we rescale the correlation index from 0 to 2. 
46
 This way of operationalizing export similarity provides the basis for a more fine-grained analysis than the 
approach used by Chau and Kanbur 2001, who classified countries into five categories: exporters of manufactures, 
primary products, fuel, services, and diversified exporters, on the basis of 1988-1992 data.  
47
 The spatial matrices have been calculated using the software MATLAB 7.0, whereas estimations are computed 
using the software STATA 11. We do not row-standardize our weighting matrix because of theoretical and 
methodological reasons. Indeed, in line with our theory we are interested in the absolute pressure on a country 
independently of the pressure on another country. Moreover, row-standardization does not come without 
consequences and may impact inference – see Plümper and Neumayer 2010, 428-31. 
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where ILO CORE CONV RATIFICATION is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if country B 
(C, D …) ratified a given ILO convention during the previous five years and EXPORT SIMILARITY 
is the variable described above, which ranges between -1 and 1. 48 
 
Hypothesis 2 generates the expectation that a state is more likely to ratify a convention if it 
has been ratified by states with whom it interacts within socialization environments. We capture 
the concept of socialization opportunities by treating IGOs as social environments and counting 
the number of shared memberships in IGOs among any two states. The empirical implication is 
that, if state A has a high number of joint memberships with country B, A is more likely to ratify 
an ILO convention if B has ratified it already. Data from the Correlates of War dataset on 
memberships in intergovernmental organizations (version 2.0) are used to construct the variable 
IGOS MEMBERSHIP.49 Formally, the spatial weight of the variable ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION for 
a country A is:50 
[ ]∑ ∗=
,...,,
_'
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48
 Our measure of economic competition are likely to lead to an underestimation of the effect of interdependent 
ratification, because it captures the attention that states pay to the ratification behavior of states hosting competing 
exporters, but not the attention paid to states hosting sizeable import-competing producers, who compete for shares 
of their own home market with the first state’s exporters. Thus, our empirical analysis should be seen as a 
conservative test of our hypothesis. 
49
 Pevehouse et al. 2004. 
50
 To help the reader visualize the two spatial variables, we present a section of the connectivity matrices for both 
COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION and ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION in the Web-Appendix. Since the three spatial terms 
are highly left-skewed, we use the logarithm to reduce the impact of outliers. In the Web-Appendix we show that 
our results are not sensitive to the logarithmic transformation. 
 24 
 
As noted above, hypothesis 2 has two additional implications that will be tested as well. The 
first implication is that, if IGOs are socializing environments that may facilitate the diffusion of 
labor standard norms among their members, then we should expect the effect of joint IGO 
membership on ratification to be stronger for IGOs that provide better opportunities for 
socialization. Specifically, we would expect IGOs with permanent and well-resourced 
bureaucracies to have a larger effect because of their stronger ability to frame policy issues, 
gather and circulate information, promote interaction among national officials, provide technical 
assistance and capacity building, establish mechanisms for social pressure and informal 
sanctions, and engage in other activities that may generate socialization effects. IGOs without 
permanent and well-resourced bureaucracies correspond to the “minimalist” type identified by 
Ingram, Robinson and Busch.51 In their coding, IGOs with permanent and well-resourced 
bureaucracies can either be “structured” or, if they have means to coerce states, 
“interventionist”. Ingram, Robinson and Busch code about 250 IGOs as minimalist, whereas 
about 150 and 50 IGOs are coded respectively as structured and interventionist. We use their 
categorization to examine whether the structure of an IGOs has an impact on the extent to which 
their member states influence each other’s ratification decisions. For this purpose, we created 
three new variables based on joint membership in minimalist, structured or interventionist IGOs 
and called them respectively ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION (MINIM.), ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION 
(STRUCT.), and ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION (INTERV.). 52  
                                                 
51
 Ingram et al. 2005. The coding was originally developed by Boehmer et al. 2004. 
52
 Structured and interventionist IGOs have, on average, a larger membership compared to minimalist IGOs, and 
therefore spatial terms are comparable in terms of mean, standard deviation, and maximum value. Since the three 
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The second implication of hypothesis 2 is that the number of joint IGO memberships of country 
dyads should influence ratification even after controlling for the absolute number of IGO that a 
country is member of. To assess this proposition, we include in our models a variable that 
expresses the number of ABSOLUTE IGO MEMBERSHIPS that each state has individually. 
 
Control Variables 
Other factors are likely to influence a state’s decision to ratify an ILO convention beyond our 
spatial terms.53 Hence we include several economic and political control variables in our model 
to avoid overestimating the effect of our main explanatory variables.  Indeed, the ratification of 
the same conventions may happen due to correlated unit-level factors or exogenous shocks that 
are common to various countries. Most of these variables are lagged by one year to avoid 
endogeneity problems. 
 
As recommended by Achen (2005), we start from a baseline model that includes only two 
control variables, which express fundamental economic and political features of countries: (the 
logarithm of) GDP per capita (GDPPC), since we expect wealthier countries to be more willing 
to promote potentially costly labor standards, and the type of political REGIME, since we expect 
                                                                                                                                                            
variables are highly correlated, i.e. ρ >.7, we include them into two separate models for each convention to avoid 
multicollinearity problems.  
53
 For discussions of some of these variables see the studies on the ratification of ILO conventions conducted by 
Chau and Kanbur 2001; Boockmann 2001, 2006; Flanagan 2003; Horny et al. 2008; and Kim 2010. 
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groups favoring labor standards to be more influential in democracies.54 Such a model provides 
preliminary evidence on whether interdependent ratification of ILO conventions is at play at all, 
as stated by our theory. 
 
In a further step, we enrich our baseline model with a larger set of covariates. We include 
(the logarithm of) POPULATION and LEGAL TRADITION, which is a dummy variable that scores 1 
if a country has a common law system; 0 otherwise.55 We also include a dummy that scores 1 
during the Cold War period, i.e. before 1989.  
 
Finally, we take into account that a set of historical, cultural and political factors may affect 
the propensity of states to commit themselves to comply with human rights norms in general, 56 
and/or norms relating to the protection of core workers’ rights in particular. To capture the first 
aspect, we create a variable – RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES – that counts how many core 
international human rights treaties a state had ratified in previous years.57 To capture the second 
aspect, we create a variable - RATIFIED ILO CORE CONVENTIONS - counting the number of core 
ILO conventions that the state had ratified in previous years. Table 1 summarizes the univariate 
statistics. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
                                                 
54
 Data on GDP per capita come from IMF (2008), whereas data on the variable REGIME, which ranges between -10 
(full autocracy) and +10 (full democracy), are from Polity IV. 
55
 Data are from World Bank 2011 and Ayyagari et al. 2006, respectively. 
56
 We are grateful to [name omitted] for directing our attention to this issue. 
57
 See the Web-Appendix for details of these treaties.  
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Findings 
 
Tables 2-8 report the results of the analysis of the baseline model including only three covariates 
(first column) and the models including the full set of covariates for each of the seven core 
conventions. For ease of interpretation, Table 9 provides an overview of the sign and 
significance of our main covariates for each convention. Overall, there is strong support for both 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.58 
 
TABLES 2-9 ABOUT HERE 
 
Regarding COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION, coefficients are positive and statistically significant 
at the conventional level for all seven conventions except C138. Results are particularly strong 
for C29 and C111, i.e. COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION is positive and statistically significant at the 
99 percent level.  
 
We obtain similar results for ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION. Coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant at the conventional level for all conventions except C98, whose 
coefficient is however still positive. For C29, C87, and C105, the variable ASSOCIATES’ 
RATIFICATION is positive and statistically significant at the 99 percent level. This indicates that, 
if state A has a large number of joint memberships in IGOs with another state that has 
                                                 
58
 Goodness-of-fit tests are reported in the Web-Appendix.  
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previously ratified an ILO core convention, country A is more likely to ratify the same 
convention.  
 
The impact of the spatial terms on the dependent variable is not only significant, but also 
substantively large. Figures 2a and b, Figure 3a and b, and Figure 4a and b illustrate the 
magnitude of the effects of both COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION and ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION on 
the probability of ratification. We show here the survival curves for conventions 29, 87 and 
111.59 
 
FIGURES 2-4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Regarding COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION, moving from a standard deviation below its mean to 
a standard deviation above its mean makes a country substantially more likely to ratify an ILO 
convention. Specifically when the value of COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION is a standard deviation 
above the mean, over the 60 year period a country’s survival rate falls to almost 0 for C29, to 
0.55 for C87, to 0.6 for C98, and to less than 0.4 for C100 and C111. Especially for C29, C87, 
and C111 the area between the two survival curves is very large, suggesting that economic 
competition between countries plays an important role in ratification decisions. 
 
The impact of ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION is also very strong. In particular, when the value of 
this variable is a standard deviation above the mean, a country’s survival rate falls to 0 for C29 
                                                 
59
 Where statistically significant, the survival curves for conventions 98, 100, 105 and 138 are shown in the Web-
Appendix.  
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after only 45 years. Similarly, moving from a standard deviation below its mean to a standard 
deviation above its mean makes the survival curve drop to 0.5 for C87, to less than 0.6 for C98, 
and to 0.4 for C100 and to 0.25 for C111. Similar to COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION, the area 
between the two survival curves is large particularly for C29, C87, and C111. Moreover, 
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION outperforms COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION in all the conventions 
except C100. We can conclude that any model that aims to predict the ratification of core ILO 
conventions, but neglects interdependent decision-making among countries, is poorly identified. 
 
The last three columns of tables 2-8 show the outcomes of the analysis that distinguishes 
between minimalist, structured and interventionist IGOs. While the findings on structured IGOs 
are mixed, there is clear evidence that interventionist IGOs have stronger effects than minimalist 
IGOs. ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION (INTERV.) is positive for every convention and statistically 
significant for C29, C87, C111, and C138. By contrast, ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION (MINIM.) is 
positive and statistically significant at the conventional level only for C29 and C87. 
 
As expected, joint IGO memberships have an effect even after controlling for the ABSOLUTE 
IGO MEMBERSHIPS of countries, which confirms our argument that the spatial effect is separate 
from the potential effect of possessing more connections to the global IGO network.  
 
Among our control variables, LEGAL TRADITION, POPULATION, and RATIFIED ILO CORE 
CONVENTIONS seem to be important predictors of the probability of ratifying ILO conventions, 
whereas the other control variables are not usually statistically significant.  
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The robustness of our results is confirmed by several additional analyses, which are reported 
in the Web-Appendix. In brief, our findings are not altered substantially by (1) using a measure 
of economic competition based on a different measure of export similarity, developed by Polillo 
and Guillén;60 (2) adding further control variables (constitutional hurdles to the ratification of 
international treaties, the number of international nongovernmental organizations with members 
in the country, the number of countries that had ratified each convention in previous years, GDP 
per capita squared, and geographical distance between countries); (3) removing certain subsets 
of IGOs (industry-specific and non-prominent IGOs) from the sample; (4) changing the cut-off 
point for the effect of the lagged dependent variable; (5) omitting logarithmic transformations; 
(6) including ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION and COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION in the same model. 
The Web-Appendix provides details of these analyses and discusses any differences with the 
results presented above. 
 
Finally, in our analyses so far, we considered each convention separately, although we 
controlled for the number of core ILO conventions ratified by country i before time t. However, 
it is possible that the ratification of a core convention x by country i might influence the 
probability that country j ratifies a core convention other than x. In the Web-Appendix, we take 
this possibility into account by performing a pooled analysis of six core conventions and find a 
statistically significant effect for most of them. 
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 Polillo and Guillén 2005. 
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The interaction between international and domestic processes 
 
The case of equal pay legislation in the United Kingdom  
 
Earlier in this paper we have hypothesized that states are more likely to ratify international labor 
conventions if their social peers have ratified them, and we focused on peer status that derives 
from common memberships in international organizations. Our statistical analysis found 
empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis. As noted above, international organizations are 
social environments that can influence behavior through a range of mechanisms, such as 
mimicking, social pressure and persuasion.61 But the formal ratification of international treaties 
in general, and ILO conventions in particular, usually is a process that involves a number of 
domestic actors in a context determined by domestic political institutions. A fuller explanation 
of ratification decisions in terms of social peer effects should therefore attempt to identify causal 
mechanisms that connect changes in the international environment (i.e., ratification by other 
states) with domestic political processes. In order to develop a hypothesis on the interaction 
between international and domestic factors in the ratification of ILO conventions, in this section 
we consider more closely one particular case, the process that led to the ratification of the Equal 
Remuneration Convention (C100) by the United Kingdom. The case study is intended to be both 
“confirmatory”, i.e. aimed at ascertaining whether foreign ratifications played a role, and 
“exploratory”, i.e. aimed at developing hypotheses on how they played that role.62 In a further 
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 Johnston 2001. 
62
 See Seawright and Gerring 2008 on confirmatory and exploratory case studies. 
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step, the resulting hypothesis about international-domestic interaction is then assessed in a 
cross-national statistical analysis.     
 
 Britain’s ratification of C100 is consistent with our hypothesis, as it came in the wake of 
international commitments made by several “peer” countries to implement equal pay for men 
and women. Such commitments included the ratification of the European Social Charter adopted 
by the Council of Europe, of which Britain was a member, the equal pay provisions in the treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community, which Britain aspired to join, and the 
ratification of ILO Convention 100 on equal pay. Figure 5 shows that the values of ASSOCIATES’ 
RATIFICATION for the UK, i.e. ratification of C100 by states with which Britain shared many 
IGO memberships, peaked at the beginning and then again at the end of the 1960s. The first 
peak triggered the start of an insistent “shaming” campaign on the part of equal pay advocates in 
the UK, while the second peak coincided with the decision to ratify C100.  
 
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
The British case thus can be considered a “typical” case from the perspective of our 
hypothesis,63 and other authors have noted that the presence of international legal commitments 
to equal pay by socially close countries was one of the factors that led to Britain’s decision to 
ratify and reform its domestic legislation in the late 1960s.64 A closer analysis of the case can be 
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 Seawright and Gerring 2008. 
64
 See Povall 1992. 
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a source of more fine-grained hypotheses on how international factors affect what is ultimately a 
domestic political process, ratification. 
 
By the time the United Kingdom ratified C100 in 1971, twenty years after its adoption by the 
ILO, the issue of equal pay for men and women had been on the British political agenda for over 
a century. While equal pay legislation was advocated by Conservative members of parliament 
such as Irene Ward and Thelma Cazalet-Keir, among the most vocal supporters of legislation 
mandating equal pay for work of equal value were women activists in the labor movement, 
including female politicians elected to parliament as candidates for the Labour Party. These 
elected representatives were relentless in raising the issue of equal pay in parliament, demanding 
appropriate legislation and the ratification of C100. A particularly prominent role in the equal 
pay campaign was played by Edith Summerskill, who forcefully advocated new legislation 
throughout her long career in the House of Commons and then in the House of Lords.65  In 
attempting to enlarge the coalition for equal pay legislation, supporters of reform developed a 
wide range of arguments; some of them were based on considerations of efficiency, but most 
were based on considerations of justice and fairness. Opponents also used a mix of economic 
and ethical arguments, and were able to block comprehensive legislation until the late 1960s. 
Historians attribute the resistance to change at least partly to traditional conceptions about 
gender roles, which were more common among male legislators than their female colleagues. 
Black and Brooke noted that, “[d]espite Labour's stated support for equal pay during and after 
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 See, for instance, Henig and Henig 2001, 20. 
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the Second World War, traditional sexual views still precluded many male M.P.s from giving 
serious political consideration to the matter.”66 
 
An analysis of parliamentary debates during the 1960s highlights the role played by foreign 
examples in the argumentative strategy of equal pay supporters. In 1963 Edith Summerskill 
stressed that several countries had already ratified C100 and that “[c]ountries within the 
Common Market are establishing equal pay for equal work and it has been written into the 
Treaty of Rome. Britain is lagging behind.”67 Shirley Summerskill, Edith’s daughter and herself 
a prominent feminist member of Parliament, also complained in the House of Commons that 
“Forty-four countries have ratified the convention [C100], but the United Kingdom has not. The 
Common Market countries, under the Treaty of Rome, are bound to ensure and maintain the 
adoption of equal pay conditions for women. In these ways, it is a disgrace that Britain is 
lagging behind other industrial countries.”68  
 
Members of the government found themselves under increasing pressure to defend Britain’s 
ratification record: Lord Chalfont, for instance, noted that “only seven countries in the world are 
party to more… Human Rights Conventions than we are.”69 However, noting that 54 countries 
had ratified C100, Edith Summerskill confronted him with the question: “If it is possible for 54 
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 Black and Brooke 1997, 444. When, in 1941, Edith Summerskill remarked in a House of Commons debate that 
even Ernest Bevin admitted “my figures [on pay inequality between men and women] are right”, Bevin retorted, “I 
think your figure’s perfect.” Cited by Henig and Henig 2001, 19.  
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 Hansard HL Deb 19 June 1963 vol 250 cc1282-96 
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 Hansard HL Deb 18 December 1967 vol 287 cc1261-4 
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countries to find it economically possible to give equal pay, why is it that Great Britain, with a 
Labour Government, fails to do so?”70 In condemning those countries that only paid lip service 
to ILO principles but failed to honor them, she stated: “I am ashamed to think that Britain is 
included among these countries.”71 She also dismissed arguments based on national specificities 
in industrial relations: “Many countries with an employment structure no less complex than our 
own have ratified the Convention. Among them are Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Norway and Sweden. If they have been able to 
ratify it, why does this country, with a Labour Government, find it impossible to do so?”72 
Similarly, Shirley Summerskill complained that “We in this country have always lagged behind 
advanced western countries in this matter, and certainly behind the Common Market countries. 
This was a shameful situation, because the way a society treats its women is an indication of its 
civilisation and progress.”73 
 
The persistence of Edith Summerskill, Shirley Summerskill and other advocates of equal 
rights legislation paid off in late 1969, when the British government finally agreed to submit 
equal pay legislation to Parliament. To a significant extent, this legislative innovation was due to 
the efforts of another prominent woman politician, Barbara Castle, who at the time was 
Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity in Harold Wilson’s Labour Party cabinet. 
The immediate impetus for the policy change came when Labour women MPs, led by Lena 
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Jeger, tabled an equal pay amendment to a government’s prices and incomes bill, which helped 
Castle to overcome the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s opposition and announce an equal pay 
bill.74 In justifying the proposed bill to her cabinet colleagues, Castle wrote that “Legislation on 
the lines I have suggested would enable us to ratify ILO Convention 100 and we should do so 
when the legislation was passed. The introduction of equal pay on these lines would bring us 
into line with the developing practice in the European Economic Community countries…”75 
Castle’s efforts succeeded, the Equal Pay Act was passed by Parliament in 1970 and C100 was 
ratified one year later.  
 
The British case highlights two aspects. First, ratification of C100 and adoption of equal pay 
legislation was a highly contentious issue in the political arena, and it pitted predominantly 
female politicians and activists against predominantly male politicians, trade unionists and 
employers. As Castle commented on the legislative episode that triggered the policy change in 
her memoirs, “[o]nce again it was the women who made the running”.76 Similarly, Edith 
Summerskill remarked that it was only because the Secretary of State for Employment and 
Productivity was a woman that there was an equal pay act at all.77 Second, references to the 
ratification of C100 and other international legal instruments on equal pay by socially close 
countries constituted a recurring component of the argumentative strategies of the supporters of 
policy change in Britain. Faced with objections to equal pay framed mainly in terms of 
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economic cost, supporters sometimes used foreign ratifications to undermine such economic 
arguments, as in Edith Summerskill’s speech quoted earlier; but most often used the gap 
between Britain and its peers as a basis of moral condemnation, as shown by the language of 
“civilization”, “disgrace” and “shame” employed in the speeches quoted above. 
 
A hypothesis on the interaction between foreign and domestic processes 
 
The UK case prompts us to formulate the following general conjecture: ratification by social 
peers can “tip the balance” in the domestic contest between supporters and opponents of 
ratification, by providing argumentative ammunition to former and potentially extending the 
pro-ratification coalition to include actors interested in the “good standing” of their state in 
international forums in addition to (or sometimes instead of) the consequences of the ratification 
on domestic labor markets.  
 
It has sometimes been noted that international law can help shift domestic balances of power 
on contentious policy issues.78 Our argument differs from this scenario in that the focus is not on 
how international treaties already ratified by a state empower certain actors within that state, but 
on how treaty ratification by other states helps certain actors to speed up ratification by their 
own state. The processes are distinct, but clearly compatible. Indeed, we can easily imagine the 
same groups first using foreign ratifications to press for domestic ratification, and then use 
domestic ratification to press for change in domestic labor practices. As an examination of the 
second step would be beyond the scope of this paper, in the following we focus on the first step.   
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 For instance, Simmons 2009 provides an extensive discussion of this effect. 
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In order to assess the conjecture stated above, we can formulate a more directly testable 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: ratification of ILO conventions by social peers will have the clearest impact 
on states where the coalition in favor of ratification is neither very weak nor very strong 
relatively to anti-ratification groups.  
 
The rationale underpinning this hypothesis is that, according to our “tipping-the-balance” 
argument, foreign examples of ratification should play a role where the coalition in favor of 
ratification is strong enough to make effective use of them, but not so strong to be able to obtain 
ratification regardless of what other states do.  
 
In the remainder of this section we present a test of this hypothesis with reference to the two 
ILO core conventions aimed at reducing gender discrimination in employment: C100 Equal 
Remuneration Convention and C111 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention 
(the latter covers gender discrimination in addition to other forms of discrimination). We focus 
on these two conventions because the previous discussion of the UK case suggests a suitable 
proxy for the strength of the pro-ratification coalition on gender discrimination treaties: the 
percentage of legislators who are women. We expect that (a) women legislators should be more 
actively supportive of ratification than men, and (b) a higher percentage of women legislators in 
a state should increase the probability of ratification. In some countries, the executive has 
exclusive competence over ratification and in most other countries the executive is responsible 
for submitting treaties for ratification to the legislature. But, as we have seen in the UK case, 
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pro-ratification legislators can press the executive to ratify or submit for ratification, and all else 
being equal this pressure is likely to be stronger if more women sit in the legislative assembly. 
Moreover, all else being equal, an executive can be more confident that its request to ratify the 
treaty will be accepted by the legislature if in the latter there is a substantial presence of women. 
These mechanisms should not be limited to countries where legislatures are competitively 
elected, since “the position of parliamentarian is visible and carries prestige in all contexts, 
providing women with symbolic power in democracies and nondemocracies alike."79 
 
 Thus, Hypothesis 3 can be tested by ascertaining whether ratification of C100 and C111 by 
social peers is most influential when the percentage of women legislators is intermediate rather 
than very low or very high. For this purpose, we analyze the interaction between our variable 
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION and a new variable expressing the percentage of FEMALE 
LEGISLATORS. This variable ranges between 0 (United Arab Emirates) and 48.8 (Rwanda) with a 
mean of 11.2.80 
 
As shown by Ai and Norton (2003), in non-linear models the significance and the sign of the 
interaction term are difficult to interpret. For ease of interpretation of the interaction terms, 
Figure 6 and 7 plot the marginal effect of ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION on the probability of 
ratifying C100 and C111 as the natural logarithm of the percentage of FEMALE LEGISLATORS in 
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data coverage in the following ways: 1) for countries that have the same parliament, we use the same percentage; 2) 
for countries that change parliament, we use the mean over the past five legislatures; 3) for the remaining missing 
data, we use linear interpolate values. Results do not change if we use the raw data. 
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parliament increases.81 In line with our hypothesis, the slope is positive, i.e. the marginal effect 
of ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION increases as FEMALE LEGISLATORS increases. However, such an 
effect is statistically significant at the conventional level only for values that lay in the middle of 
the FEMALE LEGISLATORS distribution. Conversely, the marginal effect of ASSOCIATES’ 
RATIFICATION is not statistically significant at the conventional level for very low values and 
very high values of FEMALE LEGISLATORS. This provides support for our hypothesis 3. 
 
FIGURES 6 AND 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
Conclusion 
Two themes have been voiced again and again by proponents of international labor standards, 
from the origins of the debate in the early nineteenth century, to the creation of an institutional 
machinery by the Treaty of Versailles and the revitalization of the ILO at the end of World War 
II, to recent debates about the social impact of economic globalization. The first theme is that 
the protection and promotion of labor standards is a normative obligation that sorts “good” from 
“bad” states – where goodness is, depending on the period and the ideology of the proponent, 
variously defined in terms of “Christian precepts”, “humanitarianism”, “civilization”, “social 
justice”, “human rights”, or other foundational values. The second theme is that doing the right 
thing exposes states to the risk of suffering competitive disadvantages in international markets, 
                                                 
81
 We hold the rest of the right-hand side variables constant at their median. The STATA 11 command margins was 
used to calculate these effects. Results are not sensitive to the logarithmic transformation. The results of this 
estimation are shown in the Web-Appendix. 
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and that institutionalized cooperation among potentially competing states is necessary to reduce 
that risk. This paper has assessed the absolute and relative importance of social and economic 
determinants of interdependent decisions to ratify labor rights conventions. This has allowed us 
to contribute to the growing body of literature that aims to explain the decision to, and timing of, 
ratification of international treaties by states, as well as the analysis of policy diffusion. 
 
We based our hypotheses on two influential approaches in IR theory: rational institutionalism 
and sociological institutionalism. A duration model with spatial lags was applied to 187 
countries over 62 years (1948-2009). Our findings provide strong support for the hypothesis 
derived from sociological institutionalism as well as the hypothesis derived from rationalist 
institutionalism. For six of the seven core conventions examined, we found that states are more 
likely to ratify a given convention if it has already been ratified by states with which it has a 
large number of joint IGO memberships and by states that export a similar basket of goods. This 
association is not only statistically significant but also substantively important.  
 
In addition to examining whether foreign ratification matter for domestic ratification, we also 
investigated how they matter, i.e. we searched from the causal mechanisms that produce those 
effects, specifically those that operate at the domestic level. A case study of the ratification of 
the ILO Equal Remuneration Convention by the United Kingdom showed that foreign 
ratifications were used by proponents of domestic ratification to overcome the resistance of 
opponents of policy change, mainly by using a shaming strategy. A successive statistical test 
suggested that the ratification of ILO anti-discrimination conventions by social peers has the 
clearest impact on states where the coalition in favor of ratification, and specifically female 
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legislators, is strong enough to make effective use of foreign examples, but not so strong to 
enable them to obtain ratification regardless of what other states do. This suggests that foreign 
ratifications are more likely to tip the balance in favor of ratification where the balance between 
pro-ratification and anti-ratification groups is more even. 
 
Our findings point at various avenues for further research. We note only two. First, our 
hypotheses on causal mechanisms could be empirically assessed in relation to other types of 
core conventions, notably those protecting union rights and prohibiting child and forced labor: 
what kind of actors may use their ratification by foreign states in order to tip the balance in favor 
of domestic ratification? Second, how does ratification by trade rivals, which our analysis have 
shown to matter for domestic ratification too, affect what domestic actors want and do?  How do 
the causal mechanisms differ from the effect of ratification by social peers? Such a research 
agenda could provide a valuable contribution to the further integration of domestic and system-
level explanations in the analysis of international policy diffusion.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables Mean Std. 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum No.  
Obs. 
COMPETITORS’ 
RATIFICATION 
CONVENTION 29 1.53 1.08 0 3.73 2726 
CONVENTION 87 1.76 1.03 0 3.77 4866 
CONVENTION 98 1.85 1.08 0 3.52 4327 
CONVENTION 100 2.03 1.09 0 3.49 3799 
CONVENTION 105 2.10 1.29 0 4.22 3396 
CONVENTION 111 2.11 1.17 0 3.97 3583 
CONVENTION 138 1.93 1.20 0 4.36 4198 
ASSOCIATES’ 
RATIFICATION 
CONVENTION 29 4.05 1.72 0 6.44 2726 
CONVENTION 87 4.53 1.49 0 6.51 4866 
CONVENTION 98 4.68 1.40 0 6.66 4327 
CONVENTION 100 4.95 1.37 0 6.92 3799 
CONVENTION 105 5.02 1.69 0 7.38 3396 
CONVENTION 111 5.04 1.48 0 6.98 3583 
CONVENTION 138 4.95 1.89 0 7.94 4198 
Control variables:82      
GDPPC 5.79 1.33 2.70 9.50 2400 
REGIME -1.65 7.23 -10 10 2294 
POPULATION 12.73 3.86 2.97 20.94 2111 
LEGAL TRADITION 0.27 0.44 0 1 2726 
COLD WAR 0.71 0.46 0 1 2726 
RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 1.44 2.14 0 10 2726 
RATIFIED ILO CORE CONVENTIONS 2.66 1.91 0 6 2726 
ABSOLUTE IGO MEMBERSHIPS 33.00 17.62 1 92 2726 
                                                 
82
 Descriptive statistics refer to C29. 
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Table 2. Determinants of ratification of Convention 29 
 
 VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
  
          
COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION 0.953***  0.894***     
 (0.208)  (0.213)     
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION  0.393***  0.349***    
 
 (0.097)  (0.103)    
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION (INTERV.)     0.565***   
 
  
  (0.141)   
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION (STRUCT.)      0.583***  
 
  
   (0.163)  
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION (MINIM.)       0.373*** 
 
  
    (0.088) 
GDPPC -0.032 -0.072 0.134 0.086 0.130 0.119 0.122 
 (0.087) (0.086) (0.096) (0.093) (0.097) (0.098) (0.096) 
REGIME 0.011 0.007 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
POPULATION   -0.105** -0.119** -0.080* -0.089** -0.120*** 
 
  (0.041) (0.047) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) 
LEGAL TRADITION   0.294 0.260 0.232 0.279 0.328 
 
  (0.339) (0.358) (0.363) (0.346) (0.354) 
COLD WAR   0.356 0.740* 0.548 0.845** 0.844** 
 
  (0.390) (0.424) (0.388) (0.396) (0.425) 
RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES   -0.076 -0.080 -0.077 -0.075 -0.108* 
 
  (0.059) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) (0.064) 
RATIFIED ILO CORE CONVENTIONS   0.666*** 0.710*** 0.687*** 0.698*** 0.710*** 
 
  (0.089) (0.089) (0.090) (0.090) (0.085) 
ABSOLUTE IGO MEMBERSHIPS   -0.014 -0.017 -0.018 -0.018 -0.024* 
 
  (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
 
  
     
No. of countries 118 118 114 114 114 114 114 
No. of ratifications 85 85 80 80 80 80 80 
Observations 2,105 2,105 1,865 1,865 1,865 1,865 1,865 
Robust standard errors in parentheses        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
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Table 3. Determinants of ratification of Convention 87 
 
 VARIABLES (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
  
  
          
COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION 0.495***  0.391**     
 (0.146)  (0.165)     
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION  0.243***  0.280***    
 
 (0.083)  (0.106)    
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION (INTERV.)      0.273**   
 
  
  (0.108)   
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION (STRUCT.)      0.213***  
 
  
   (0.080)  
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION (MINIM.)       0.209* 
 
  
    (0.110) 
GDPPC -0.128 -0.148* -0.378** -0.402*** -0.400*** -0.379** -0.400*** 
 (0.085) (0.084) (0.151) (0.152) (0.152) (0.154) (0.148) 
REGIME 0.035** 0.036** 0.071*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.076*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) 
POPULATION   -0.212*** -0.229*** -0.209*** -0.207*** -0.211*** 
 
  (0.040) (0.042) (0.040) (0.041) (0.043) 
LEGAL TRADITION   -0.675* -0.728** -0.740** -0.705* -0.741** 
 
  (0.361) (0.368) (0.368) (0.366) (0.366) 
COLD WAR   2.246*** 2.501*** 2.332*** 2.356*** 2.430*** 
 
  (0.401) (0.444) (0.413) (0.416) (0.448) 
RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES   0.098* 0.108** 0.098* 0.087* 0.103* 
 
  (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.052) (0.053) 
RATIFIED ILO CORE CONVENTIONS   1.099*** 1.096*** 1.113*** 1.119*** 1.107*** 
 
  (0.132) (0.130) (0.130) (0.132) (0.135) 
ABSOLUTE IGO MEMBERSHIPS   0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.004 
 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
  
     
No. of countries 159 159 157 157 157 157 157 
No. of ratifications 93 93 90 90 90 90 90 
Observations 4,022 4,022 3,762 3,762 3,762 3,762 3,762 
Robust standard errors in parentheses        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
 
 54 
Table 4. Determinants of ratification of Convention 98 
 
 VARIABLES (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
  
  
          
COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION 0.558***  0.372**     
 (0.162)  (0.189)     
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION  0.231*  0.055    
 
 (0.123)  (0.140)    
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION (INTERV.)      0.336   
 
  
  (0.211)   
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION (STRUCT.)      0.192  
 
  
   (0.180)  
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION (MINIM.)       -0.071 
 
  
    (0.088) 
GDPPC -0.093 -0.120 -0.392** -0.388** -0.383** -0.385** -0.391** 
 (0.083) (0.084) (0.180) (0.175) (0.181) (0.177) (0.171) 
REGIME 0.019 0.020 0.052** 0.055** 0.052** 0.053** 0.053** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) 
POPULATION   -0.218*** -0.204*** -0.208*** -0.209*** -0.195*** 
 
  (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) 
LEGAL TRADITION   -0.300 -0.334 -0.372 -0.342 -0.297 
 
  (0.400) (0.403) (0.406) (0.403) (0.397) 
COLD WAR   2.402*** 2.364*** 2.419*** 2.447*** 2.222*** 
 
  (0.420) (0.431) (0.419) (0.438) (0.437) 
RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES   0.165*** 0.156*** 0.163*** 0.161*** 0.150*** 
 
  (0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.053) (0.053) 
RATIFIED ILO CORE CONVENTIONS   1.175*** 1.197*** 1.180*** 1.185*** 1.229*** 
 
  (0.089) (0.090) (0.088) (0.089) (0.090) 
ABSOLUTE IGO MEMBERSHIPS   -0.009 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 -0.009 
 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
  
     
No. of countries 159 159 157 157 157 157 157 
No. of ratifications 102 102 97 97 97 97 97 
Observations 3,560 3,560 3,229 3,229 3,229 3,229 3,229 
Robust standard errors in parentheses        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
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Table 5. Determinants of ratification of Convention 100 
 
 VARIABLES (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) 
  
  
          
COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION 0.642***  0.294*     
 (0.138)  (0.164)     
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION  0.564***  0.227**    
 
 (0.147)  (0.115)    
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION (INTERV.)      0.049   
 
  
  (0.191)   
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION (STRUCT.)      -0.090  
 
  
   (0.141)  
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION (MINIM.)       0.066 
 
  
    (0.124) 
GDPPC -0.051 -0.064 -0.088 -0.076 -0.079 -0.086 -0.076 
 (0.079) (0.078) (0.126) (0.125) (0.125) (0.126) (0.126) 
REGIME 0.009 0.006 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) 
POPULATION   -0.066* -0.067* -0.075** -0.072* -0.075** 
 
  (0.037) (0.039) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) 
LEGAL TRADITION   -0.317 -0.346 -0.351 -0.335 -0.346 
 
  (0.266) (0.275) (0.280) (0.279) (0.275) 
COLD WAR   0.039 0.151 0.117 0.045 0.141 
 
  (0.282) (0.311) (0.283) (0.290) (0.287) 
RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES   0.081 0.085 0.080 0.076 0.084 
 
  (0.057) (0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.061) 
RATIFIED ILO CORE CONVENTIONS   0.976*** 0.968*** 0.983*** 0.994*** 0.975*** 
 
  (0.066) (0.066) (0.068) (0.067) (0.071) 
ABSOLUTE IGO MEMBERSHIPS   -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 -0.007 
 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) 
 
  
     
No. of countries 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 
No. of ratifications 128 128 125 125 125 125 125 
Observations 3,061 3,061 2,783 2,783 2,638 2,638 2,638 
Robust standard errors in parentheses        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
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Table 6. Determinants of ratification of Convention 105 
 
 VARIABLES (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) 
  
  
          
COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION 0.307***  0.222*     
 (0.097)  (0.124)     
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION  0.287***  0.256***    
 
 (0.075)  (0.090)    
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION (INTERV.)      0.115   
 
  
  (0.114)   
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION (STRUCT.)      0.155  
 
  
   (0.118)  
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION (MINIM.)       0.042 
 
  
    (0.098) 
GDPPC -0.005 -0.015 0.164 0.167 0.153 0.157 0.145 
 (0.072) (0.071) (0.104) (0.103) (0.101) (0.101) (0.100) 
REGIME 0.035*** 0.031** 0.023 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.022 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
POPULATION   -0.052 -0.066** -0.076** -0.078** -0.075** 
 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
LEGAL TRADITION   1.318*** 1.324*** 1.241*** 1.245*** 1.240*** 
 
  (0.285) (0.285) (0.285) (0.283) (0.281) 
COLD WAR   -0.484 -0.303 -0.253 -0.188 -0.238 
 
  (0.305) (0.311) (0.319) (0.318) (0.317) 
RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES   0.024 0.042 0.038 0.044 0.030 
 
  (0.049) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
RATIFIED ILO CORE CONVENTIONS   0.871*** 0.861*** 0.866*** 0.863*** 0.865*** 
 
  (0.073) (0.072) (0.071) (0.071) (0.072) 
ABSOLUTE IGO MEMBERSHIPS   -0.010 -0.013 -0.010 -0.011 -0.010 
 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 
  
     
No. of countries 160 160 158 158 158 158 158 
No. of ratifications 125 125 120 120 120 120 120 
Observations 2,825 2,825 2,559 2,559 2,481 2,481 2,481 
Robust standard errors in parentheses        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
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Table 7. Determinants of ratification of Convention 111 
 
  
(36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) 
VARIABLES        
  
  
          
COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION 0.718***  0.490***     
 (0.133)  (0.152)     
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION  0.450***  0.277**    
 
 (0.127)  (0.110)    
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION (INTERV.)      0.340***   
 
  
  (0.120)   
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION (STRUCT.)      0.350***  
 
  
   (0.124)  
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION (MINIM.)       0.173 
 
  
    (0.106) 
GDPPC 0.053 0.035 0.096 0.106 0.106 0.114 0.107 
 (0.070) (0.068) (0.127) (0.125) (0.126) (0.124) (0.131) 
REGIME -0.011 -0.013 -0.015 -0.016 -0.017 -0.017 -0.014 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) 
POPULATION   0.026 0.026 0.030 0.022 0.056 
 
  (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.045) 
LEGAL TRADITION   0.118 0.124 0.096 0.110 0.176 
 
  (0.300) (0.299) (0.301) (0.298) (0.303) 
COLD WAR 
  
-0.929*** -0.855*** 
-
0.911*** -0.767** -1.060*** 
 
  (0.292) (0.301) (0.291) (0.309) (0.287) 
RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES   -0.063 -0.067 -0.068 -0.067 -0.089 
 
  (0.063) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.067) 
RATIFIED ILO CORE CONVENTIONS   0.936*** 0.941*** 0.945*** 0.938*** 0.952*** 
 
  (0.078) (0.077) (0.077) (0.076) (0.079) 
ABSOLUTE IGO MEMBERSHIPS   -0.020* -0.026** -0.025** -0.025** -0.030*** 
 
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
 
  
     
No. of countries 160 160 159 159 159 159 159 
No. of ratifications 128 128 123 123 123 123 123 
Observations 2,923 2,923 2,648 2,648 2,648 2,648 2,648 
Robust standard errors in parentheses        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
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Table 8. Determinants of ratification of Convention 138 
 
  
(43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) 
VARIABLES        
  
  
          
COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION 0.140  -0.127     
 (0.129)  (0.081)     
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION  0.536***  0.353*    
  (0.129)  (0.192)    
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION (INTERV.)       0.462*   
 
  
  (0.247)   
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION (STRUCT.)      0.324  
 
  
   (0.206)  
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION (MINIM.)       -0.098 
 
  
    (0.204) 
GDPPC 0.021 0.021 0.292*** 0.289*** 0.283*** 0.288*** 0.281*** 
 (0.060) (0.059) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) 
REGIME 0.027** 0.021* -0.002 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.000 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
POPULATION   0.130** 0.126** 0.138** 0.128** 0.125* 
 
  (0.064) (0.060) (0.059) (0.060) (0.065) 
LEGAL TRADITION   -0.236 -0.203 -0.216 -0.196 -0.228 
 
  (0.294) (0.298) (0.299) (0.300) (0.291) 
COLD WAR 
  
-3.243*** -2.442*** 
-
2.463*** -2.550*** -3.268*** 
 
  (0.600) (0.734) (0.729) (0.724) (0.633) 
RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES   -0.067 -0.043 -0.044 -0.048 -0.070 
 
  (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046) (0.051) 
RATIFIED ILO CORE CONVENTIONS   0.948*** 0.944*** 0.949*** 0.942*** 0.943*** 
 
  (0.129) (0.128) (0.127) (0.127) (0.128) 
ABSOLUTE IGO MEMBERSHIPS 
  
-0.021*** -0.025*** 
-
0.024*** -0.024*** -0.019* 
 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) 
 
  
     
No. of countries 162 162 157 157 157 157 157 
No. of ratifications 125 125 120 120 120 120 120 
Observations 3,486 3,486 3,249 3,249 3,249 3,249 3,249 
Robust standard errors in parentheses        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
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Table 9. Overview of sign and statistical significance of main variables 
 
ILO 
Convention 
COMPETITORS’ 
RATIFICATION 
ASSOCIATES’ 
RATIFICATION 
ASSOCIATES’ 
RATIFICATION 
(MINIM.) 
ASSOCIATES’ 
RATIFICATION 
(STRUCT.) 
ASSOCIATES’ 
RATIFICATION 
(INTERV.) 
C29 +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** 
C87 +** +*** +* +*** +** 
C98 +** + - + + 
C100 +* +** + - + 
C105 +* +*** + + + 
C111 +*** +** + +*** +*** 
C138 - +* - + +* 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Figure 1. Survival rates of the seven core conventions. 
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Figures 2a, b. Ratification of Convention 29: survival estimates for different levels of COMPETITORS’ 
RATIFICATION and ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION. 
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Figures 3a, b. Ratification of Convention 87: survival estimates for different levels of COMPETITORS’ 
RATIFICATION and ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION. 
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Figures 4a, b. Ratification of Convention 111: survival estimates for different levels of COMPETITORS’ 
RATIFICATION and ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION. 
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Figure 5. Convention 100: values of ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION for the United Kingdom between 1953 (year after first ratification) and 1971 
(year of UK ratification).  
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Figure 6. Marginal effect of ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION at different levels of FEMALE LEGISLATORS, Convention 100. 
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Figure 7. Marginal effect of ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION at different levels of FEMALE LEGISLATORS, Convention 111. 
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Why do states commit to international labor standards? 
The importance of “rivalry” and “friendship” 
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A. PH Test 
Table A1 shows the test of the proportional hazard assumption based on the scaled Schoenfeld 
residuals, in relation to Convention 29. The output from the test is non-significant, indicating the 
absence of evidence contradicting the proportionality assumption. Results are similar for models 
that include ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION, and for other conventions. 
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Table A1. PH Test (Model 1), Convention 29. 
Variables Rho chi2 df Prob>chi2 
COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION 0.00 0.00 1 0.99 
GDPPC 0.07 0.45 1 0.50 
POPULATION 0.16 2.26 1 0.13 
LEGAL TRADITION 0.21 2.42 1 0.12 
COLD WAR -0.18 2.29 1 0.13 
REGIME -0.16 1.96 1 0.16 
RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES -0.04 0.17 1 0.68 
ABSOLUTE IGO MEMBERSHIPS 0.07 0.20 1 0.66 
RATIFIED ILO CORE CONVENTIONS 0.11 0.66 1 0.42 
Global test  10.96 9 0.28 
 
B. Excerpts from connectivity matrices  
To help the reader visualize the two spatial variables, Table A2 and Table A3 present a section 
of the connectivity matrices for both COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION and ASSOCIATES’ 
RATIFICATION. 
 
Table A2. First eight countries in the connectivity matrix related to COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION, 
1980. 
 AFG AGO ALB ARE ARG AUS AUT BDI 
AFG 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.01 0.11 0.11 0.23 0.03 
AGO 0.01 0.00 0.42 0.96 0.13 0.07 0.03 0.16 
ALB 0.14 0.42 0.00 0.45 0.18 0.30 0.13 0.02 
ARE 0.01 0.96 0.45 0.00 0.16 0.14 0.10 0.04 
ARG 0.11 0.13 0.18 0.16 0.00 0.56 0.22 0.06 
AUS 0.11 0.07 0.30 0.14 0.56 0.00 0.36 0.12 
AUT 0.23 0.03 0.13 0.10 0.22 0.36 0.00 0.12 
BDI 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.12 0.12 0.00 
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Table A3. First eight countries of the connectivity matrix related to ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION, 
1980. 
 AFG AGO ALB ARE ARG AUS AUT BDI BEL 
AFG 0 11 9 20 20 21 20 15 20 
AGO 11 0 7 12 12 11 11 12 12 
ALB 9 7 0 9 10 12 12 9 12 
ARE 20 12 9 0 24 23 23 18 23 
ARG 20 12 10 24 0 37 37 21 39 
AUS 21 11 12 23 37 0 44 20 47 
AUT 20 11 12 23 37 44 0 20 59 
BDI 15 12 9 18 21 20 20 0 21 
BEL 20 12 12 23 39 47 59 21 0 
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C. Survival estimates for conventions 98, 100, 105 and 138 
 
Figures A1. Ratification of Convention 98: survival estimates at different levels of COMPETITORS’ 
RATIFICATION. 
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Figures A2a, b. Ratification of Convention 100: survival estimates at different levels of COMPETITORS’ 
RATIFICATION and ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION. 
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Figures A3a, b. Ratification of Convention 105: survival estimates at different levels of COMPETITORS’ 
RATIFICATION and ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION. 
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Figures A4. Ratification of Convention 138 survival estimates at different levels of ASSOCIATES’ 
RATIFICATION. 
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D. Model fit 
 
Figures A.3a,b show that there are no concerns of lack of fit by comparing the jagged line to the 
reference line. When plotting the Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard estimator for Cox-Snell 
residuals, the right-hand tail shows some variability that is caused by the reduced effective 
sample produced by prior failures and censoring. Problems of prior failures and censoring are 
particularly severe in case of C29, since the vast majority of countries ratified this convention 
before 1990. This is the reason why there is some variability in the right-hand tail of Figure A.3. 
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Figures A.3a, b. Goodness of fit: Convention 29 and Convention 138. 
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E. The control variable RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 
In the main text, we noted that the analysis of ratification of ILO core conventions should 
control for the propensity of states to commit to human rights norms in general. To capture this 
propensity, created a variable – RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES – that counts how many core 
international human rights treaties a state ratified in previous years. The treaties included are (1) 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (2) its first optional protocol, (3) its 
second optional protocol, (4) the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, (5) the International Covenant on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, (6) its 
provisions on individual petition, (7) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, (8) the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, (9) its optional protocol, (10) the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, (11) the International Convention on the Protection of Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families. Ratification information is from UCL’s Nominal Commitment to 
Human Rights project. 83 
 
                                                 
83
 See Çali et al. 2009. 
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F. Robustness checks: a different measure of economic competition 
We checked whether and how our findings change by using the measure of export similarity 
developed by Polillo and Guillén instead of the measure developed by Elkins, Guzman and 
Simmons.84 In this indicator trade data are disaggregated at product level (two-digit level 
classification) yielding 77 product vectors. Data come from United Nations Global Common 
Database. Again, we used (rescaled) Pearson correlation coefficients between product vectors 
for countries i and j in year t-1 to obtain this second indicator of export similarity. We label this 
variable EXPORT SIMILARITY 2. We constructed a variable labeled COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION 2 
using the same procedure that yielded COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION (see main text), but on the 
basis of EXPORT SIMILARITY 2 instead of EXPORT SIMILARITY. We found that COMPETITORS’ 
RATIFICATION 2 has a positive and statistically significant effect on the ratification of C29, C87 
and C111, as COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION does. The effect of COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION 2 on 
the ratification of C98, C100 and C105 is still positive but, contrary to COMPETITORS’ 
RATIFICATION, it is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Its effect on the ratification 
of C138 has also the expected sign but is not statistically significant.   
 
G. Robustness checks: additional control variables 
The analysis presented in the main text section found support for hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 
with regard to six of the seven core conventions. This section considers whether these findings 
are robust to the inclusion of a range of additional control variables. First, we control for the 
presence of CONSTITUTIONAL HURDLES to the ratification of international treaties.85 This variable 
should be treated with the utmost caution as we have only one value per country for the whole 
period under consideration, hence we included it in only one model for each of our three main 
independent variables. Second, given the possible role played by international non-
governmental organizations (INGOs) in promoting commitment to human rights norms, we 
control for the NUMBER OF INGOS with members in the country86. Third, we include a variable 
                                                 
84
 Polillo and Guillén 2005. 
85
 Simmons 2009. 
86
 Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005. 
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that counts the number of countries that had ratified each convention in previous years 
(CUMULATIVE RATIFICATIONS). This variable is never statistically significant, a result that is 
important for two reasons. First, it shows that diffusion is not merely driven by the increasing 
number of countries ratifying ILO conventions, a finding that would contradict our argument. 
Second,, including CUMULATIVE RATIFICATIONS allows us to check for potential endogeneity 
resulting from the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable as an independent variable in our 
model.87 Fourth, we add GDPpc squared, since previous studies suggested that the relationship 
between economic development and ratification of ILO conventions is not linear.88 Fifth, we 
include an additional spatial term that we call NEIGHBORS’ RATIFICATION, which indicates the 
effect of ratification by countries that are geographically close. We do this in order to ensure 
that our variables ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION and COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION capture the 
functioning of the mechanisms hypothesized by rationalist institutionalism and sociological 
institutionalism, and not simply a mechanism of emulation among close neighbors. NEIGHBORS’ 
RATIFICATION is obtained by multiplying the reciprocal of distance with the number of ILO 
conventions that the other country ratified within the past five years.89  
As shown in Tables A4 and A5, the inclusion of these additional control variables confirms 
the importance of COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION and ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION for the 
ratification of C29.  Similarly, after including the same set of additional control variables, 
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION and COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION continue to have a positive and 
statistically significant effect also with regard to the other conventions, which confirms the 
findings of the main analysis. The main difference with the analysis reported in the main text 
concerns C98, where COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION loses statistical significance when 
NEIGHBORS’ RATIFICATION is included.  
Following Boockmann and Horny et al.,90 we considered the possibility that ratification of a 
convention may be less costly for states that already ratified “predecessor” conventions, i.e. past 
conventions that are explicitly cited and revised by the convention under consideration. Of our 
seven core conventions, only C138 has predecessor conventions. We created a variable counting 
                                                 
87
 See Plümper  and Neumayer 2010, 425. 
88
 Horny et al. 2008. 
89
 Data on distance are from the GeoDist database. See Meyer and Zignago 2011. 
90
 Boockmann 2001 and Horny et al. 2008. 
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how many of the ten conventions cited in C138 had been previously ratified by a state, but the 
variable is not statistically significant at the conventional level (not shown in table). 
Finally, we tried to identify measures of the bargaining power of labor in the domestic 
economy, but all proxies that we considered were either too detached from the underlying 
concept or available only for a small subset of countries and years. We encountered similar data 
limitation problems in relation to measures of the partisan (left/right) composition of executives. 
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Table A4. Determinants of the ratification of Convention 29: COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION with 
additional control variables. 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) `(5) (6) 
       
COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION 0.847*** 0.902*** 0.889*** 0.919*** 0.893***  
 (0.215) (0.218) (0.231) (0.238) (0.304)  
COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION (3-YEAR 
LAG)      0.937*** 
      (0.203) 
GDPPC 0.140 0.186* 0.340*** 0.459*** 0.465** 0.152 
 (0.099) (0.100) (0.127) (0.161) (0.186) (0.095) 
POPULATION -0.107** -0.107*** -0.022 -0.026 0.050 -0.074* 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.053) (0.053) (0.064) (0.039) 
LEGAL TRADITION 0.345 0.376 0.544* 0.593* 0.300 0.288 
 (0.353) (0.347) (0.321) (0.316) (0.377) (0.314) 
COLD WAR 0.320 0.040 -1.685** -1.619** -2.447*** 0.135 
 (0.397) (0.410) (0.767) (0.768) (0.923) (0.413) 
REGIME 0.002 -0.016 -0.022 -0.027 -0.017 0.005 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) 
RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES -0.063 -0.069 -0.116* -0.122** -0.090 -0.058 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.057) (0.101) (0.060) 
ABSOLUTE IGO MEMBERSHIPS -0.015 -0.019 -0.032** -0.030* -0.029* -0.019 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) 
RATIFIED ILO CORE CONVENTIONS 0.682*** 0.649*** 0.746*** 0.725*** 0.726*** 0.680*** 
 (0.092) (0.091) (0.090) (0.090) (0.108) (0.081) 
CONSTITUTIONAL HURDLES -0.155      
 (0.240)      
NUMBER OF INGOS  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
CUMULATIVE RATIFICATIONS   -0.030*** -0.028** -0.032***  
   (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  
GDPPC2    -0.000 -0.000  
    (0.000) (0.000)  
NEIGHBORS’ RATIFICATION     -0.002  
     (0.081)  
       
No. of countries 108 106 106 106 106 114 
No. of ratifications 77 77 77 77 77 80 
Observations 1,756 1,717 1,717 1,717 1,573 1,859 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A5. Determinants of the ratification of Convention 29: ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION with 
additional control variables 
 
VARIABLES (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
       
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION 0.310*** 0.349*** 0.359*** 0.369*** 0.299**  
 (0.104) (0.107) (0.102) (0.103) (0.119)  
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (3-YEAR 
LAG)      0.508*** 
      (0.132) 
GDPPC 0.090 0.130 0.317*** 0.413*** 0.380** 0.119 
 (0.097) (0.096) (0.123) (0.148) (0.168) (0.097) 
POPULATION -0.117** -0.121** -0.029 -0.033 -0.007 -0.104** 
 (0.048) (0.047) (0.058) (0.058) (0.073) (0.049) 
LEGAL TRADITION 0.300 0.346 0.549* 0.568* 0.263 0.287 
 (0.372) (0.362) (0.332) (0.323) (0.390) (0.354) 
COLD WAR 0.669 0.474 -1.541** -1.470* -2.295*** 0.805** 
 (0.435) (0.432) (0.763) (0.759) (0.776) (0.405) 
REGIME 0.000 -0.017 -0.024 -0.029 -0.020 -0.003 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) 
RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES -0.069 -0.075 -0.131** -0.136** -0.145 -0.064 
 (0.063) (0.062) (0.064) (0.062) (0.109) (0.061) 
ABSOLUTE IGO MEMBERSHIPS -0.017 -0.022 -0.038** -0.037** -0.029* -0.020 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) 
RATIFIED ILO CORE CONVENTIONS 0.726*** 0.692*** 0.787*** 0.774*** 0.777*** 0.694*** 
 (0.093) (0.090) (0.088) (0.088) (0.101) (0.088) 
CONSTITUTIONAL HURDLES -0.184      
 (0.230)      
NUMBER OF INGOS  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
CUMULATIVE RATIFICATIONS   -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.032***  
   (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)  
GDPPC2    -0.000 -0.000  
    (0.000) (0.000)  
NEIGHBORS’ RATIFICATION     0.068  
     (0.076)  
       
No. of countries 108 106 106 106 106 114 
No. of ratifications 77 77 77 77 77 80 
Observations 1,756 1,717 1,717 1,717 1,717 1,865 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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H. Robustness checks: subsamples of IGOs 
We checked if splitting the sample of IGOs into those that Jason Beckfield classifies as 
“prominent” in 2000 and all the others alters our results.91 We found little evidence that joint 
membership in prominent IGOs has a stronger effect than joint membership in non-prominent 
IGOs. Furthermore, we excluded from the sample of IGOs those organizations that Ingram, 
Robinson and Busch coded as “industry-specific”,92 in order to reduce the correlation between 
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION and COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION (since members of industry-
specific IGOs are likely to have higher levels of export similarity). Our main results do not 
change. Table A6 presents the outcome of these analyses with regard to C29.  
 
                                                 
91
 Beckfield 2010. 
92
 Ingram et al. 2005. 
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Table A6. Ratification of Convention 29: ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION with subsamples of IGOs 
(non-prominent and not industry-specific). 
 
VARIABLES (13) (14) (15) (16) 
          
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION (PROMINENT) 0.808***    
 (0.175)    
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION (NON-PROMINENT)  0.007***   
  (0.001)   
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION (PROMINENT - NOT 
INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC)   0.057***  
   (0.008)  
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION (STRUCTURED - NOT 
INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC)    0.007*** 
    (0.001) 
GDPPC 0.170* 0.133 0.149 0.163* 
 (0.103) (0.095) (0.108) (0.099) 
REGIME 0.006 -0.004 0.003 0.004 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) 
POPULATION -0.045 -0.106*** -0.029 -0.068* 
 (0.035) (0.039) (0.039) (0.036) 
LEGAL TRADITION 0.372 0.352 0.323 0.213 
 (0.329) (0.340) (0.318) (0.343) 
COLD WAR 0.693* 1.190*** 0.750* 0.822** 
 (0.394) (0.448) (0.384) (0.394) 
RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES -0.051 -0.064 -0.068 -0.049 
 (0.063) (0.060) (0.066) (0.060) 
RATIFIED ILO CORE CONVENTIONS 0.690*** 0.685*** 0.676*** 0.677*** 
 (0.088) (0.087) (0.086) (0.090) 
ABSOLUTE IGO MEMBERSHIPS -0.023 -0.029** -0.020 -0.025* 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
     
No. of countries 114 114 114 114 
No. of ratifications 80 80 80 80 
Observations 1,865 1,865 1,865 1,865 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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I. Other robustness checks 
 
In order to assess whether the five-year cut-off point for the effect of the lagged dependent 
variable influences the results we lagged the dependent variable by three years. Column No. 6 in 
table A4 and column No. 12 in Table A5 show the outcome of this analysis. Lagging the 
dependent variable by only three years mitigates endogeneity concerns; in other words, we can 
be confident that our results are not driven by the lagged dependent variable on the right hand-
side of the equation. 
We also checked whether our results are similar if we do not employ a logarithmic 
transformation. Table A7 reports sign and significance of our main covariates for each 
convention.93 The main differences are for C105, whose spatial terms lose statistical 
significance, and C138, whose spatial terms turn negative and, in the case of COMPETITORS’ 
RATIFICATION, significant. Thus, there is evidence that few outliers are driving the results for 
C105 and C138 if the logarithmic transformation is not in place.94     
 
Table A7. Overview of sign and statistical significance of main variables, logarithmic 
transformation omitted 
ILO 
Convention 
COMPETITORS’ 
RATIFICATION 
ASSOCIATES’ 
RATIFICATION 
ASSOCIATES’ 
RATIFICATION 
(MINIM.) 
ASSOCIATES’ 
RATIFICATION 
(STRUCT.) 
ASSOCIATES’ 
RATIFICATION 
(INTERV.) 
C29 +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** 
C87 +*** +*** +** +** +** 
C98 +** +* + +** +*** 
C100 +* +** +* + + 
C105 + - - + + 
C111 +*** +*** +* +*** +*** 
C138 -** - - - - 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
                                                 
93
 Full results are available upon request. 
94
 For instance, the United States did not ratify C138, though their COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION and ASSOCIATES’ 
RATIFICATION covariates score very high values. 
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Finally, we include COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION and ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION in the same 
model. States with similar export profiles are likely to join the same international institutions,95 
which in turn provide socialization opportunities to those states. Thus, while the effects 
hypothesized in the main text can be considered as logically distinct at the most abstract level, 
we expect there to be some overlap at the level of the general indicators chosen to express 
economic competition and socialization opportunities, i.e. export similarity and shared IGO 
memberships. Consequently, also COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION and ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION 
can be expected to be correlated to some extent. Empirically, we found that COMPETITORS’ 
RATIFICATION 2 is less correlated with ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION than COMPETITORS’ 
RATIFICATION is, and so it should provide a better insight into the distinctive role played by 
economic competition in ratification decisions. Table A8 provides an overview of the sign and 
the statistical significance of the main variables when they are included in the same model, 
which also includes our baseline control variables GDPPC and REGIME.96 Although the 
correlation between the two spatial terms is quite high, it is striking that COMPETITORS’ 
RATIFICATION 2 and ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION are both positive and statistically significant for 
C29 and C111. Importantly, whenever ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION is statistically significant in 
the models reported in the main text, it continues to be so after the inclusion of COMPETITORS’ 
RATIFICATION 2, except in the case of C105. On the other hand, COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION 
loses significance in predicting ratification of conventions C100 and C105 and COMPETITORS’ 
RATIFICATION loses the ability to predict the ratification of C87, although the signs remain 
positive in those cases. In sum, even though our two main variables are somewhat overlapping, 
we can conclude that they capture two different mechanisms of interdependent ratification of 
ILO conventions.97 
 
                                                 
95
 Baccini and Dür 2012. 
96
 Full results are available upon request. 
97
 As suggested by Heagerty and Zheng (2005), we calculate ROC curves from the survival model to assess the 
predictive accuracy of our models with COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION and ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION for each 
convention. We find that there is no difference between model with COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION and models with 
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION, suggesting that these two variables have similar explanatory power. Results are 
available upon request. 
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Table A8. Overview of sign and statistical significance of the main variables when included in 
the same model. 
ILO 
Convention 
COMPETITORS’ 
RATIFICATION in 
model with 
ASSOCIATES’ 
RATIFICATION 
COMPETITORS’ 
RATIFICATION 2 
in model with 
ASSOCIATES’ 
RATIFICATION 
ASSOCIATES’ 
RATIFICATION in 
model with 
COMPETITORS’ 
RATIFICATION 
ASSOCIATES’ 
RATIFICATION in 
model with  
COMPETITORS’ 
RATIFICATION 2 
C29 +** +*** + +*** 
C87 +* + - +* 
C98 +** + - + 
C100 + + +** +*** 
C105 + + +** + 
C111 +*** +** + +** 
C138 - + +*** +*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
J. Interdependence among ILO conventions 
In our main analysis we considered each convention separately, although we controlled for the 
number of core ILO conventions ratified by country i before time t. However, it is possible that 
the ratification of a core convention x by country i might influence the probability that country j 
ratifies a core convention other than x. This may be due to the fact that the core conventions are 
sometimes bundled together as expression of a comprehensive commitment to the protection of 
basic rights at work, not least by the ILO itself in its promotional activities. For instance, by 
1998 Indonesia had ratified four core conventions and, in announcing the government’s 
intention to ratify the remaining three, the Indonesian Manpower Minister declared that "There 
are seven main conventions, and the countries which have ratified them are considered 
democratic."98 After ratification, the ILO Director-General publicly congratulated Indonesia on 
                                                 
98
 “Indonesia Has Ratified Four ILO Conventions” Antara-The Indonesian National News Agency, October 22, 
1998. The Minister also declared that "By ratifying these conventions, the protection over labourers at home would 
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its becoming "the first country in the Asia-Pacific region to have ratified all seven of the core 
conventions covering fundamental principles and right at work."99 The ILO also publicized the 
fact that Indonesia was the 47th of ILO's 170 member States to have ratified all seven core 
conventions.  
This interdependence among conventions is illustrated by Figure A4, which shows the 
distribution of the maximum number of ILO conventions ratified in the same year by each 
country in the dataset. For instance, Botswana, Eritrea, and Gambia ratified all seven 
conventions in the same year, whereas Brunei, Bhutan, and Taiwan have ratified no conventions 
during the period under investigation.100 In general, the majority of the countries ratified more 
than one convention per year, whereas less than 10 percent of the countries do not ratify any 
core conventions. 
Because the ILO and governments sometimes treat core conventions as a cohesive set, states 
may be influenced not only by the ratification of a specific convention by others, but also by the 
ratification of core conventions in general. To account for this possibility, we relaxed the 
assumption that ratifications of core conventions are independent from one another. 
Specifically, we pooled six core conventions together (we left C138 out from this analysis, 
because this convention was ratified much later than the others and so we would lose many 
observations by including it). By pooling the conventions together, our dependent variable 
becomes the number of years before a country ratifies one of the six conventions. Thus, 
countries do not leave the dataset when they ratify a convention. In other words, we have 
multiple unordered failures of the same events. To correctly estimate this model, we used the 
Efron method and stratified observations by convention. In essence, we allowed for a different 
baseline hazard function for each convention. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
be clearer, while on the other hand it would also improve the Indonesian image in the international forum." 
“Indonesian Govt to ratify Three ILO Conventions”, Business Line, April 8, 1999. 
99
 “Indonesia ratifies core ILO conventions”, Business Line, June 12, 1999. 
100
 Brunei ratified C138 in 2011. 
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Figure A4. Distribution of the maximum number of ILO conventions ratified in the same year 
by each country in the dataset.  
 
Table A9 shows the results of this analysis. Spatial terms capturing COMPETITORS’ 
RATIFICATIONS for each convention are highly collinear with one another as well as the spatial 
terms capturing ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION. Thus, we include each spatial term in a separate 
model to avoid multicollinearity problems. Moreover, results for COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION of 
C29 are very similar to results for COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION of C87 and C98. Likewise, 
results for ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION of C29 are very similar to results for ASSOCIATES’ 
RATIFICATION of C87 and C98. As such, we only report estimates of models including 
COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION of C29 and ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION of C29. The other results 
are available upon request. 
The key insights from this test are two. First, there is evidence that both COMPETITORS’ 
RATIFICATION of C29 and C100 and ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION of C29 and C100 influence the 
ratification of the other conventions. Indeed, the coefficients of these variables are positive and 
statistically significant at the 99 percent level. Second, COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION of C111 
and ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION of C111 are not statistically significant at the conventional level 
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(and the former variable has a negative coefficient). This result might be explained by the fact 
that C111 was ratified by countries with an average 20-year lag compared to the other 
conventions. 
 
Table A9. Pooled analysis of core conventions 
 
 
VARIABLES (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
              
COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION of C29 0.457*** 
(0.052) 
COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION of C100  0.111***     
  (0.040)     
COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION of C111   -0.000    
   (0.004)    
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION of C29    0.261***   
    (0.036)   
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION of C100     0.233***  
     (0.041)  
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION of C111      0.035 
      (0.028) 
GDPPC 0.013 0.001 0.007 0.010 -0.011 0.004 
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
REGIME 0.008 0.015** 0.016*** 0.010 0.012** 0.015** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
POPULATION -0.053*** -0.054*** -0.039*** -0.063*** -0.080*** -0.047*** 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
LEGAL TRADITION 0.274*** 0.255*** 0.256*** 0.252*** 0.236** 0.252*** 
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) 
COLD WAR -0.224** -0.184* -0.296*** -0.017 0.025 -0.210* 
(0.106) (0.111) (0.105) (0.111) (0.117) (0.124) 
RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 0.043** 0.021 0.007 0.044** 0.033* 0.015 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
RATIFIED ILO CORE CONVENTIONS 0.525*** 0.559*** 0.579*** 0.526*** 0.531*** 0.567*** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.031) 
ABSOLUTE IGO MEMBERSHIPS -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.011*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Observations 46,120 46,120 46,120 46,120 46,120 46,120 
Number of groups 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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If we include COMPETITORS’ RATIFICATION of  C87, or of C98, and ASSOCIATES’ 
RATIFICATION of C87 or C98 instead of the corresponding variables for C29, we obtain similar 
results to those reported in Table A9: the competitor as well as the associate ratification 
variables have a positive and statistically significant effect on the ratification of other 
conventions. 
 
K. Interaction between ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION and FEMALE LEGISLATORS 
 
Table A.10. Interaction between ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION and FEMALE LEGISLATORS, conventions 100 and 
111. 
VARIABLES  (23) (24) 
      
 Convention 100 Convention 111 
   
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION 0.117 0.098 
(0.075) (0.070) 
ln(FEMALE LEGISLATORS) -0.049 0.009 
(0.213) (0.214) 
ASSOCIATES’ RATIFICATION*ln(FEMALE LEGISLATORS) 0.025 0.001 
(0.039) (0.039) 
GDPPC -0.046 -0.011 
(0.041) (0.039) 
REGIME 0.002 -0.003 
(0.007) (0.007) 
Constant -2.156*** -2.176*** 
(0.455) (0.443) 
Observations 2,916 2,790 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
L. Competition and norms in the creation of the ILO 
The main text has focused on the role that economic competition and normative socialization 
play in the decision to ratify conventions adopted by the ILO. A separate but related question is 
whether the same factors – concerns about the impact of labor standards on economic 
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competitiveness on the one hand and promotion of reputedly universal values on the other hand 
– played a role in the creation of the ILO as an institution in the first place. Both rationalist and 
sociaological institutionalism would expect that their respective logics of action operate at both 
levels: the creation of the broader institutional framework as well as the commitments taken in 
the context of that institution. This section supports those claims by offering a brief overview of 
the process that led to the creation of the ILO.  
Political leaders, labor unionists, social reformers and scholars have been aware of the 
international dimensions of labor and social legislation for at least two centuries. The French 
statesman and financier Jacques Necker wrote in 1788 that  
“the country which, out of barbarian ambition, would abolish the day of rest prescribed 
by religion, would probably attain a certain degree of superiority if it were the only 
country to do so; but as soon as other nations follow the lead, this advantage would be 
lost, and shares in sales would return to what they had been prior to the change. The 
same reasoning demonstrates that countries where days of rest are multiplied beyond the 
norm will have a disadvantage with respect to countries that have selected as days of rest 
only the holy days imposed by the church.”101  
Throughout the nineteenth century, opponents of legislation aimed at improving working 
conditions routinely invoked the harm that such measures would inflict on the international 
competitiveness of domestic industries.102 From the 1830s onwards, advocates of social reform 
and labor legislation argued that damaging regulatory competition could be overcome by means 
of international treaties establishing minimum standards with regard to hours of work, days of 
rest, night work of women, employment of children, and other practices. The most energetic 
campaigner for international labor treaties was Daniel Legrand who, in an appeal addressed to 
the governments of all industrial countries in 1855, argued that  
“In modern industrial Europe there are certain matters that individual nations cannot 
regulate except in the form of an agreement between the interested powers … An 
international labour law is the only possible solution to the great social problem of 
granting moral and material well-being to the working class without working a hardship 
                                                 
101
 Cited in Bairoch 1999, 161. 
102
 Engerman 2003. 
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upon the manufacturers or upsetting the competitive balance between the industries of 
these countries”103  
In the writings of Legrand and other supporters of international labor treaties, references to 
competitive pressures were often intertwined with appeals to the duties of governments to 
improve the condition of the working classes as an essential requirement of civilization, often 
with reference to the promotion of Christian values. For instance, Éduard Ducpétiaux, who first 
suggested the establishment of an international labor organization, urged in 1843: “Let nations 
unite for social reform instead of frustrating one another’s efforts … All civilized nations should 
concur in this truly holy alliance which should open to humanity a new era of well-being and 
universal satisfaction”.104 This quotation highlights two themes that recurred in debates on 
international cooperation on labor issues in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: the protection 
of core labor standards is a moral obligation for any state that wants to belong to the club of 
“civilized nations” (later: the community of states respecting human rights and social justice); 
and international cooperation is necessary to protect states fulfilling those moral obligations 
from economic losses.   
During the second half of the nineteenth century, the issue of international labor regulation 
moved from the pamphlets of social reformers, the resolutions of workers’ associations and 
academic treaties onto the agenda of governments. For instance, in response to a motion brought 
in 1885 to the German parliament in favor of the international regulation of labor standards, 
Chancellor Bismarck declared that  
“A normal workday could be established for Germany alone if Germany were 
surrounded by a Chinese wall and were economically self-sufficient. Such is not the 
case. It would be necessary to establish a universal workday union analogous to the 
postal union, as well as a universal wage union. This would have to embrace the United 
States, England, and every industrial country”.  
Bismarck pointed out that “this is impossible in the world in which we live”105. However, the 
1880s and 1890s witnessed the first attempts by European governments to negotiate 
international labor treaties and create an international labor organization. Two international 
                                                 
103
 Cited in Follows 1951, 38. 
104
 Cited in Follows 1951, 46. 
105
 Cited in Follows 1951, 91. 
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labor conventions were adopted in 1906 and twenty-eight bilateral treaties on labor issues had 
been concluded by 1914.  
The decisive breakthrough came at the end of World War I. The British government took the 
lead in designing the new international labor regime, as it reasoned that, 
 “from the British economic point of view, it was clearly to the advantage of a country 
that was among the most advanced in the regulation of conditions of employment to 
encourage the movement to that end. Once free competition had been restored it would 
be very difficult to raise the general standard of wages or condition or even to maintain 
the present minimum in industries which depended on foreign markets, unless similar 
standards were applied in all competing markets”.106  
The preamble to the Constitution of the ILO, approved in 1919 as Part XIII of the Treaty of 
Versailles, summarized the reasons for regulating labor conditions through international 
cooperation. On the one hand, it stated that universal “peace can be established only if it is 
based upon social justice” and that “conditions of labour exist involving such injustice, hardship 
and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and 
harmony of the world are imperilled”. On the other hand, it stated that “the failure of any nation 
to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to 
improve the conditions in their own countries”.107 As in the nineteenth century, appeals to 
“social justice” and “humane” working conditions were intertwined with concerns about the loss 
of international competitiveness. 
The contracting parties to the Treaty of Versailles decided that the plenary body of the ILO, 
the International Labor Conference (ILC), could adopt conventions with a two-thirds majority. 
There were a range of views on how conventions should become legally binding on states. Some 
labor unions would have preferred international regulations to become immediately applicable 
within member states. The Italian representatives in the commission that drafted the ILO 
Constitution proposed that conventions should be automatically binding, but with the right of 
governments to appeal to the League against decisions of the ILC. The British representatives in 
the commission wanted conventions to be ratified automatically within one year of adoption, 
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unless specifically rejected by national legislatures.108 These proposals were rejected as too 
intrusive on state sovereignty, and the ILO Constitution only requires governments to submit 
conventions to the competent authorities (normally parliaments) within a year. As long as the 
competent authorities do not ratify the convention, the state has no legal obligation to implement 
them.  
This brief overview of the emergence of the ILO as an international institution has 
highlighted the importance of two factors: first, appeals to shared values among states; second, 
international labor conventions as solution to the problem of raising potentially costly standards 
in a competitive international environment. As shown in the main section, these concerns also 
play an important role in the decision to ratify specific ILO conventions.  
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